UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-24-2017

Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc.
Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 44612

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc. Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 44612" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All.
6710.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6710

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OFTHE

STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case Number : 44612-2016
Bonneville County District Court Number: CV-2015-3927

LINCOLN LAND COMPANY, LLC, an Idaho limited liability company,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT-CROSS RESPONDENT
vs.

LP BROADBAND, INC.,a Colorado corporation, successor by merger to
MicroServ, Inc., an Idaho corporation,
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State ofidaho,
in and for Bonneville County
Hon. Dane H. Watkins, District Judge

DEFENDANT'S - RESPONDNET/CROSS-APPELLANTS' BRIEF

Mark R. Fuller
Fuller&Beck Law Offices, PLLC
PO Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405
Attorneys for Plaintiff

Larren K. Covert
Swafford Law, PC
655 S. Woodruff Ave.
Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Attorneys for the Defendant

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
P0Box2720
Boise, ID 83701
Attorneys for Third Party
Defendant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Cases and Authorities .............................................................................. 2
Statement of the Case ........................................................................................ .4
Issues Presented on Appeal ................................................................................... 6
Attorney Fees on Appeal ..................................................................................... 7
Argument ....................................................................................................... 8
Standard of Review ............................................................................. 8
I.

The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to LP Broadband by determining
that no benefit was confe1red to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land
Company............................................................................................ 9

IL The District Court erred in detelTnining that the standard to establish a claim for unjust
enrichment requires that the benefit conferred upon the party unjustly enriched must
be provided directly by the party seeldng to
recover ............................................................................................ .13
III. The District Court e1red in denying LP Broadband's request for attorney fees ............ 16
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 20
Certificate of Service ........................................................................................ 21

1

TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Cases
Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc.
118 Idaho 463, 797 P.2d 863 (1990) .................................................................................. 10, 14
Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd. Partnership
145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008) ............................................................................... 9, 11,12
Dunnick v. Elder
126 Idaho 308, 882 P.2d 475 (Ct.App.1994) ............................................................................. 8
Eliopulos v. Knox
123 Idaho 400,848 P.2d 984 (Ct.App.1992) ............................................................................. 8
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc.
137 Idaho 703, 52 P.3d 848 (2002) .......................................................................................... 16
Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc.
144 Idaho 171, 158 P.3d 947 (2007) ........................................................................................ 17
G & M Fanns v. Funk Inigation Co.
119 Idaho 514,808 P.2d 851 (1991) ................................................................... 8
Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc.
134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (Ct.App.2000) ............................................................. 8
Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck
109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1985) ............................................................... 14,15,16
McGrew v. McGrew
139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833,844 (2003) .......................................................................... 18
Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier
219 Tenn. 45,407 S.W.2d 150 (1966) ..................................................................................... 16
Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P.
143 Idaho 641, 152 P.3d 2 (2006) ............................................................................................ 17
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist.
125 Idaho 872, 876 P.2d 154 (Ct.App.1994) ............................................................................. 8
Stevenson v. Windeimere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc.
152 Idaho 824,275 P.3d 839 (2012) ...................................................................... 9,10,13,14,19
Wymanv.Eck
161 Idaho 723,390 Idaho 449 (2017) ........................................................................................ 8
Statutes
Idaho Code Ann.§ 12-120 .................................................................................................. 7, 16,17
Idaho Code Ann. § 12-121 ....................................................................................................... 7, 18
Rules
I.A.R. 40 ......................................................................................................... 7
I.A.R. 41 ....................................................................................................... 7
I.R.C.P. 54 .................................................................................................7, 18
I.R.C.P. 56 ...................................................................................................... 8

2

Seconda1y Sources
42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts §9 (2013) ............................................................................................ 9
66 Am.Jur.2d Restitution and Implied Contracts §3(1973) ....................................... .14,15
Black's Law Dictionary (101h ed. 2014) ................................................................... 17

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LP Broadband, Inc.("Defendant") is the successor by merger to MicroServ Computer
Technologies, Inc. ("MicroServ"). As such, Defendant is entitled to all defenses, rights and
obligations ofMicorServ.
Lincoln Land Company, ("Plaintiff') brought this action claiming Defendant was
unjustly emiched in the use of rooftop space on property Plaintiff purchased. On March 20,
2000, MicroServ entered into an agreement with General Mills ("GM") for the use of a grain
elevator rooftop for a location for antenna equipment. This agreement was for the Evans
Grainery location owned, operated or in use by GM. This agreement allowed for MicroServ to
install and utilize equipment on the property for the payment of $50.00 per month. The
agreement requires that any party seeking to tenninate the agreement must give a 90 day notice
before termination. Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings R. pp. 75-76.
MicroServ installed equipment at this location and utilized the equipment until April,
2014. Pursuant to the rental agreement, MicroServ and then Defendant paid the monthly rent
pursuant to the agreement with GM for each month beginning March, 2000 until April, 2014.
Exhibit B to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings R. pp. 77-88. No termination of the agreement was
made by Defendant nor GM at any time.
In approximately June, 2010, Plaintiff purchased the property where the rooftop space
was being utilized. Defendant and MicroServ did not have any notice or lmowledge of any
change of ownership of the property by Plaintiff until April, 2014 when Plaintiff sent a letter to
Defendant. There was no notification or signage on the property to indicate any ownership
change to Plaintiff. Exhibit C to the Affidavit ofAdam Gillings R. pp. 89-95.
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At all times from March, 2000 until April, 2014, GM operated as ifit had all authority to
rent the property to Defendant. GM allowed access to the property and collected the rent
payments from Defendant.
On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant claiming Defendant was unjustly
emiched by Plaintiff. The sole claim indicated the unjust emichment was the result of the use of
the rooftop space by Defendant.
Plaintiff filed for partial summary judgment and Defendant filed for summary judgment.
Both motions were heard by the District Court on April 13, 2016. The District Court entered a
Memorandum Decision and Order on May 18, 2016 granting Defendant's summary judgment
motion. Judgment was entered on August 19, 2016. Defendant requested attorney fees and costs
on September 2, 2016. The District Comi denied the request for attorney fees on October 5,
2016.
Appeal was timely taken by Plaintiff on the judgment granting summary judgment and by
Defendant on the denial of attorney fees.
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

I.

The District Court erred in granting Sunnnary Judgment to LP Broadband by determining
that no benefit was conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land Company.

II. The District Court erred in determining that the standard to establish a claim for unjust
emichment requires that the benefit conferred upon the party unjustly enriched must
be provided directly by the paiiy seeking to recover.
III. The District Court erred in denying LP Broadband's request for attorney fees. (CrossAppeal Issue)
IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The Plaintiffs hereby request attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121; Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 54; Appellate Rules 40 and 41; and, all other
applicable mies and statutes .. On appeal Idaho Code § 12-120(3) compels an award attorney
fees to the prevailing paiiy in any civil action involving a commercial transaction. A conunercial
transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal or household
pmposes." LC.§ 12-120(3). In this case, the alleged interaction between the Plaintiff and
Defendant is commercial in nature as it is not a personal or household pmpose.
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ARGUMENT
Standard of Review
On review of a summary judgment order, this Court employs the same standard used
below. Wyman v. Eck, 161 Idaho 723, 390 Idaho 449 (2017) Summary judgment is proper "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." IR.C.P. 56(c). When assessing a motion for summary judgment,
all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore,
the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the party resisting the motion. G &

M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna
Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
The party moving for summaty judgment initially carries the burden to establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct.App.1992). The burden may
be met by establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be
IT -

required to prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478
(Ct.App.1994). Such an absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing
with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and
tl1e contention that such proof of an element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134
Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254, 1255 (Ct.App.2000). Once such an absence of evidence has been
established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the motion to show, via further
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to
offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under LR.C.P. 56(f). Sanders, 125 Idaho at 874,
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876 P.2d at 156.
The moving party is entitled to summaiy judgment when the nonmoving paiiy fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that paiiy's case
on which the paiiy will hem the burden of proof at trial. Brewer v. Washington RSA No.8 Ltd

Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184 P.3d 860, 864 (2008).

I.

The District Court erred in granting Summary Judgment to LP Broadband by

determining that no benefit was conferred to LP Broadband by Lincoln Land Company.

Plaintiffs initial issue on appeal seeks to invalidate the District Cami's decision that
"Lincoln Land did not, as a matter of law, confer a benefit on LP Broadband." Memorandum

Decision and Order, R. p. 375.
A prima facie case for unjust enrichment exists where: "(l) there was a benefit conferred
upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3)
acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to
retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff for the value thereof." Stevenson v.

Windermere Real Estate/Capital Grp., Inc., 152 Idaho 824,827,275 P.3d 839, 842 (2012) "A
person confers a benefit upon another ifhe or she gives the other some interest in money, land,
or possessions, performs services beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies the debt of
the other, or in any way adds to the other's advantage." 42 C.J.S. Implied Contracts §9 (2013)
In this matter, it is undisputed that the only alleged benefit Defendant obtained was the
access to and use of the rooftop space. The District Comi correctly concluded that this alleged
benefit was not given by the Plaintiff, but by GM who occupied the property. It was GM that
entered into a rental agreement with Defendant, allowed access to the property and collected the
rent for the use. Defendant had been on the property based on this agreement for 10 years prior
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to the Plaintiff even purchasing the property. Plaintiff did not confer anything to the Defendant.
By its own admission, Plaintiff did not even !mow of the existence of Defendant on the property
until January, 2015. Complaint para. 5 R. p. 17.
The requirement of the Plaintiff to actually confer a benefit on the Defendant has a long
history in Idaho case law. This Comt most recently discussed this matter in the case of Medical

Recovery Services, LLC v. Bonneville Billing and Collections, Inc., 157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802
(2014). Within the analysis of this case, this Court thoroughly reviewed the relevant case law
which flows through Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 797 P.2d
863 (1990) and Stevenson v. Windermere Real Estate/Capital Group, Inc., 152 Idaho 824,275
P.3d 839 (2012). Each of these cases and the internally cited cases therein all supp01t this Court's
statement that the Plaintiff in an unjust emichment case must confer an actual benefit to the
Defendant to satisfy the first requirement in an unjust emichment claim. Medical Recovery

Services, LLC at 399.
The Plaintiff seeks to reduce this Court's analysis in Medical Recovery Services to apply
to only money and not the requirement that a Plaintiff must confer an actual benefit. This Comt
in Medical Recovery Services did not limit its findings to personal propeity, but rather
consistently referenced the full spectrum of money, land, possessions, or services as noted in the
C.J.S.
In Medical Recovery Services, a judgment and execution documents were obtained by
Medical Recovery Services against a debtor. Medical Recovery Services then undertook efforts
to have wages garnished from the employer of debtor. The garnishment was mistakenly sent
from the employer to another collection company, Bonneville Billing and Collections, which
also had outstanding amounts owed by the same debtor. Medical Recovery Services sought to
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obtain the funds from Bonneville Billing and Collections, but was unsuccessful. Medical
Recovery Services then filed suit against Bonneville Billing and Collections for unjust
emichment.
On appeal, this Court overturned the District Court's determination that Medical
Recovery Services was entitled to relief based on unjust emichment. In the analysis of the case,
this Court noted that Medical Recovery Services did not confer any direct benefit on Bonneville
Billings and Collections. Id at 399, 806. The Court held that Medical Recovery Services did

nothing to directly benefit or at the request of Bonneville Billing and Collections. The Cami
noted that Medical Recovery Services did nothing for the direct benefit of anyone else. Id.
Plaintiff has also argued that GM had no legal basis to confer any benefit on Defendant
and therefore any benefit to Defendant must have come from Plaintiff. This assertion is also
inc01rect. This Court addressed this issue in the case of Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Limited

Partnership, 145 Idaho 735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008). In Brewer, this Court addressed the leasing of
a property owned by multiple tenants to Inland Cellular. Id This Comi noted that co-tenants had
no power or right to lease a portion of the property to the exclusion of the other co-tenants
without approval of all tenants. Id at 738. While these facts and legal standing had importance to
other legal issues in the case, they had no significance to the Comi' s analysis of the unjust
enrichment.
In evaluating the unjust enrichment claim, this Court made no references to the legal
basis for Inland Cellular's occupancy of the prope1iy. The analysis turned only on the issues of
the use of the property as a benefit and evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment.
As the legality of the permission given was not an issue in Brewer the same is true for this
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matter. The elements for unjust emichment examine who provided a benefit, not if there was a
legal basis for that benefit.
The District Court also relied upon the analysis of the Brewer case to determine if a
benefit was conferred. This Court's analysis of Brewer for the purpose of a benefit being
conferred noted that the property was being occupied by Inland Cellulm. Id The reading of the
decision on Brewer shows that this occupancy of the property, by itself, was not sufficient to
show a benefit conferred by the Plaintiffs. Id at 739. It is important to note that in Brewer,just
as in this case, plaintiffs did not know of Inland Cellulm' s use of the land, and the use was
ongoing at the time the plaintiffs acquired their interests. All of these factors show that the
occupancy of the property was not sufficient, standing alone, to show a benefit conferred from
plaintiffs to Inland Cellular.
The facts of Brewer and this matter me very similm. Plaintiff in this matter acquired this
property during the time that Defendant was occupying the rooftop pursuant to the agreement
with GM. Plaintiff did not know of Defendant's use during this time. Plaintiff has only asserted
that the use of the property was the alleged benefit. Just as in Brewer, this use nnder these
circumstances is not sufficient to meet the pr:ima facie elements for nnjust emichment, benefit or
any cause of action.
The District Court's granting summary judgment based on no benefit given from the
Plaintiff to Defendant was proper. There were no material facts in dispute as to the occupancy of
the rooftop and there was no legal basis to sustain the assertion that Plaintiff provided a benefit
to Defendant.

I

I
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II.

The District Court erred in determining that the standard to establish a claim for

unjust enrichment requires that the benefit conferred upon the party unjustly enriched
must be provided directly by the party seeking to recover.
Plaintiff finally argues that the District Court e!1'ed in finding there must be a direct
benefit provided from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. The District Court primarily relied upon the
Medical Recovery Services case and the analysis therein for its support of this finding.

As discussed above, the legal history of confel1'ing an actual benefit by the Plaintiff is
well established in Idaho. In Medical Recovery Services, this Court noted that "to confer a
benefit in the context of unjust enrichment, the plaintiff must give the defendant an interest in
money, land, or possessions, or perform services beneficial to, or at the request of, the other."
Medical Recovery Services at 399 (emphasis added). This Court further stated,

The benefit enjoyed by BBC in this case, funds from three checks
totaling $1,083.21, was confe!1'ed on BBC by WSEC because
WSEC sent the checks. In this respect, MRS' argument is very
similar to the plaintiff's argument in Beco, who argued it could
recover on an unjust enrichment theory for a benefit it did not
directly confer. It is also similar to the plaintiffs' argument in
Stevenson that Windermere's benefit resulted from a benefit they
conferred on Jefferson. We rejected both those arguments.
Likewise, we reject MRS' argument in this case. Id.
This Court in Stevenson specifically addressed the type of maneuvering Plaintiff seeks to employ
in this matter. The Court stated, "The Stevensons' argument, reduced to its essence, is that
because they conferred a benefit upon Jefferson, and Jefferson confe!1'ed a benefit upon
Windermere, they can cut out the middleman and directly recover from Windennere for unjust
enrichment." Stevenson at 827. This Comt rejected this type ofrecovery in unjust enrichment
cases, stating there must be a direct benefit.
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In each of the above cases, this Court has required that the benefit in an unjust
enrichment case be given directly by the Plaintiff to the Defendant. In Medical Recovery
Services, the benefit, a check, was given by a third paiiy, WSEC, to the Defendant, BBC.
Medical Recovery Services at 399. In Stevenson, the benefit, a commission check, was given by a

third paiiy, Winde1mere, to the Defendant, Jefferson. Stevenson at 829. In Beco, the benefit, a
contract awmd, was given by a third party, M-K, to the Defendant Bannock Paving Company.
Beco at 867. In each of these cases, this CoUii held that where the benefit did not directly come

from the Plaintiff and go directly to the Defendant, there is no unjust enrichment. In this case, the
benefit, access to the property and use of the rooftop space was given by a third-party, GM, to
the Defendant.
The Beco case provides additional insight to the requirements of the direct benefit. In
Beco, plaintiff made the mgument that "the equitable principle of unjust enrichment does not

require the plaintiff and the defendant to have any other relationship beyond the nexus that one
party may not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the other." Id. This Court rejected this
argument, noting that all cited cases by Beco involved pmties who actually had a contractual
relationship or a claim to real property which were the underlying reasons for the unjust
enrichment claims. Id. It was this connection between the parties that allowed the unjust
enrichment claim to stand.
Plaintiff inappropriately relies upon the case of Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, l 09 Idaho
737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1985) for the proposition that Idaho law does not require a direct
link between the plaintiffs benefit and defendant. Plaintiffs cited quote from the Idaho Lumber
case is not a statement of the Court, but a reference to 66 Am.Jur. 2d Restitution and Implied
Contracts §3(1973). This statement in its entirety states,
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The phrase "unjust emichment" is used in law to characterize the
result or effect of a failure to make restitution of, or for, property
or benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a
legal or equitable obligation to account therefor. It is a general
principle, underlying various legal doctrines and remedies, that one
person should not be permitted unjustly to emich himself at the
expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or
for propeity or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where
it is just and equitable that such restitution be made, and where
such action involves no violation or frustration of law or
opposition to public policy, either directly or indirectly.
Thus, Idaho has not adopted this statement into its case law but merely referenced the section.
The facts and holdings of Idaho Lumber support the finding of s requirement of direct
benefit as well. Iu Idaho Lumber, Idaho Lumber furnished materials and labor pursuant to a
contract with Walker for renovations of a building. Walker was not the property owner, but had
leased the property from Buck. Walker defaulted on the contract and Idaho Lumber brought suit
for the outstanding amount owed for work on the property. Walker :filed for and was granted a
bar1kruptcy on the amount owed to Idaho Lumber. Idaho Lumber sought damages against Buck
for unjust emichment. Idaho Lumber supra.
The court held that the unjust emichment action was proper as there was a connection
between Idaho Lumber and Buck. This connection was the property Idaho Lumber had supplied
materials and services to improve was Buck's prope1ty. Idaho Lumber had directly provided a
benefit to Buck in increasing the value of his property. Id.
The Idaho Lumber case does not support a finding that there does not have to be a
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant in an unjust emichment, but just the opposite.
There must be some direct link between the plaintiff and defendant and the benefit given in order
to support a claim for unjust emichment.
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Plaintiff on appeal continues to ignore the actions of GM and the role GM played in this
matter. Specifically Plaintiff states, "it is not material ... if General Mills is the actual
wrongdoer." If the holdings of Idaho Lumber are to be completely applied, Plaintiff was
obligated to seek any damages from GM before seeking them against Defendant, and Defendant
was not unjustly enriched by its payments to GM. In Idaho Lumber, the Court of Appeals
adopted the language and rule from the Tennessee case of Paschall's Inc. v. Dozier, 219 Tenn.
45, 407 S.W.2d 150 (1966), The rule stated,
The most significant requirement for a recovery on quasi contract
is that the enrichment to the defendant be unjust. Consequently, if
the landowner has given any consideration to any person for the
improvements, it would not be unjust for him to retain the benefit
without paying the furnisher. Also, we think that before recovery
can be had against the landowner on an unjust enrichment theory,
the furnisher of the materials and labor must have exhausted his
remedies against the person with whom he had contracted, and still
has not received the reasonable value of his services.
As Plaintiff has not sought recovery for the errors of GM and it is undisputed that Defendant has
given consideration to GM for the use of the property, there could be no unjust enrichment claim
prosecuted by the Plaintiff in this matter pursuant to the rule adopted in Idaho Lumber.
The District Court did not error in finding Plaintiff was required to provide a direct
benefit to the Defendant. Sununary judgment was proper.
III. The District Court erred in denying LP Broadband's request for attorney fees.
l.C.§12-121(3)
The awarding of attorney fees under LC. 12-120(3) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 711, 52 P.3d 848, 856 (2002). To
prove an abuse of discretion this Court looks to three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of
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its discretion and consistent with legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it;
and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.Id. However,
whether a statute awarding attorney fees applies to a given set of facts is a question of law and
subject to free review. Ransom v. Topaz Marketing, L.P., 143 Idaho 641,644, 152 P.3d 2, 5
(2006). "Whether a district comt has correctly determined that a case is based on a 'commercial
transaction' for the purpose ofI.C. § 12-120(3) is a question oflaw. This Court exercises free
review over questions oflaw." Fritts v. Liddle & Moeller Const., Inc., 144 Idaho 171, 173, 158
P.3d 947, 949 (2007).
A commercial transaction is defined as "all transactions except transactions for personal
or household purposes." LC. § 12-120(3). This plain language requires the interaction in this
matter to be determined a commercial transaction. None of the parties in this matter are
individuals and therefore none of the interaction can be personal. Additionally, this matter did
not involve a claim related to household purposes. Black's Law Dictionary (lO'h ed. 2014)
defines transaction as "any activity involving two or more persons."

In this matter, Plaintiff alleged an activity involving itself and Defendant. Plaintiff
claimed that this activity was sufficient to produce a contract implied in law. This claim is
sufficient to satisfy the clear definition of a commercial transaction between Plaintiff and
Defendant.
The fact that this connection was adjudicated to not have occurred should not be
construed to defeat a claim for attorney fees based on a commercial transaction. Should the
Plaintiff prevailed, it could then claim that as a result of the action a commercial transaction had
been established, a contract implied in law, and could therefore recover under a theory of
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I
commercial transaction. The ability to recover under a statute should not be beneficial to only
one party no matter the outcome of that party's case.
I.C.§12-121 and I.R.C.P 54(e)(2)

An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121 is not a matter ofrightto the
prevailing pmty, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding
belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without
foundation. McGrew v. McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). When deciding
whether attorney fees should be awarded under LC.§ 12-121, the entire course of the litigation
must be taken into account and if there is at least one legitimate issue presented, attorney fees
may not be awarded even though the losing party has asse1ted other factual or legal claims that
are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id.
The District Court e1Ted in determining that this matter was not brought and defended
frivolously. The District Court relied on the fact that, "General Mills clearly did not have the
authority to sublease the rooftop space to LP Broadband;" and "Lincoln Land provided evidence
that the sub-lease's value was below market." Memorandum Decision R. p. 438. These findings,
however, do not produce a finding that the case was legitimate.
The required analysis is that there must be one legitimate issue. In this matter, only one
issue was presented, unjust enrichment. While this issue has several parts, a legitimate issue must
be found, not a part of that issue.
Plaintiffs allegation of unjust enrichment is frivolous, despite the apparent claim of at
least one legitimate question of one part. Frivolous conduct is defined as actions and claims that
are not suppmted by the facts or in law. In this matter, Plaintiff sought over one-hundred
thousand dollars from Defendant without any basis in law or in fact. In the Memorandum
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Decision and Order the District Court noted that two Idaho Supreme Court cases were directly
on point in this matter. Both cases showed that a necessary element of the claim of unjust
emichment was that the Plaintiff confer a benefit on the Defendant. In this matter, Plaintifflmew
it did not confer any benefit on the Defendant. In Plaintiffs Complaint, Plaintiff aclmowledged
that Defendant was operating on the property pursuant to an agreement with the third-party, GM.
Plaintiff lmew that GM was allowing Defendant to access the property and was collecting rent
for the Defendant's use of the property. There was no benefit given to the Defendant by the
Plaintiff what so ever. The complete lack of any factual suppmt for this initial part of the analysis
for unjust emichment makes the Plaintiffs case frivolous.
In the Stevenson case, the district court found and this Comt upheld the decision that the
Defendant was entitled to attorney fees as the case was brought and/or defended frivolously.

Stevenson at 830. In Stevenson, exactly as in this matter, the Plaintiffs claim was dismissed as
there was no benefit given from the Plaintiff to the Defendant. Id. The fact that there was no
evidence presented of a direct benefit provided from the Plaintiff to the Defendant made the
unjust emichment claim meritless. Id.
If there is no factual basis or argument to meet one of the required elements for a cause of
action, any suit on that cause of action is frivolous. The argument that on the other two elements
there was a potential factual basis is insufficient to legitimize the claim.
In this matter, Plaintiffs knowledge of the actions of GM and the lack of a benefit it
provided shown even in the Complaint, evidence that the case was brought and defended
frivolously.

I

I
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CONCLUSION
The allegations of the Plaintiff on appeal are not suppmied by long standing case law in
Idaho. The dete1minations by the District Court in granting sunnnary judgment are conect and
sunnna:ry judgment was properly granted. Attorney fees both below and on appeal should be
granted as this matter meets the clear and unambiguous language ofI.C.§ 12-121(3) and this
matter has been brought and defended frivolously pursuant to I.C.§ 12-121.

. ,, ,Jft-

DATED this

4

day of May, 2017.
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LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Mark R. Fuller, Esq.
410 Memorial Drive, Suite 201
PO. Box 50935
Idaho Falls, ID 83405-0935

D
D
D

Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax:

~ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid

Alexander P. McLaughlin
Givens Pursley, LLP
POBox2720
Boise, ID 83701

D
D
D

Designated courthouse box
Hand-delivered
Fax:

~c? t,:-f,'-__
LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent

21

